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Background

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(SSC)

In April 1935, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities published their Final Report (Book II) which in essence faulted the CPTA and to some extent for its error of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its attempts on the life of ^{the} premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's report is ~~discussed~~ on pages 6-7 of its Findings but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

P7
Book II
have

"Senior CPTA officials also should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized that CPTA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they duped their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CPTA had no

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0002475 evidence of a foreign conspiracy?

Stung by the Senate criticism and the "ripple effect" that Book V ~~has~~ occasioned in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer at least within the Agency, the critical questions posed in the Final Report. However, even the 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the CIA's ^{current} response to the Warren Commission's quest for all ^{possible} relevant information. ["Relevancy" is, of course, the "buzzword" upon which both the Senate and Agency each base their position of the ^{importance} anti-Castro plots to the Commission's work.] On page 10 of the Agency's conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that: "We

While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have saved to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. C.I.A., too could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement ~~and the~~ ^{in the} assassination (GFK) because of tension of the time.

..... The Agency should have

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P 10
1977 ~~Final~~
Report

taken broader initiatives, then,
as well."

It is not the purpose of
this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the
conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and CPTA
with regard to the significance
of the CIA's Castro assassination
attempts and to resolve ~~the~~ ^{the parties}
controversy as to ~~the~~ ^{the operations} importance.
~~Rather~~ I noted this paper seeks
to present a comprehensive
review of all the facts, drawn from
a variety of sources, of organized
clandestine involvement or potential
involvement in CPTA operations
against Cuba during 1960-63.
Certain influences and conclusions
~~it~~ will then be drawn upon
the nature, scope, and motivation
~~of the operations~~ of the syndicate
participants in the operations.

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Envolvement of Raymond Munn in
CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

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The genesis of the ^{utilization} ~~use~~ of the United States ~~central~~ ^{central} syndicate & the CIA attempt to assassinate Castro is of the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, ~~was~~ Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffell Edwards.⁺

[1967 FO Rpt. p. 74; Intern Rpt p. 74; Sec memo.]

Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the right party to "eliminate or assassinate" Castro, to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Mahon⁺ who ~~has~~ had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive cover operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

⁺ [Mahon's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp 74-75, Intern Report]

0002181 Although Mahon and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Rosselli's name for consideration there was a meeting between Mahon and Rosselli at the Brown Derby Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1968 [Intern Report p. 25]

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[Comment: Mahon seems the

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logical person to have thought of and contacted Roselli for several reasons. In an office of Security file on SA Morgan, Mahan's attorney, there is a memo to the DCP dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that "Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice-making machine on the Strip! Mahan advised that, if Roselli was in fact a member of the Club, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests."

quotes?

0002182

Comment

Confirmation of ^{see} earlier contact Mahan - Roselli contact is found in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959. [See Roselli write-up] from Mahan to Roselli

Comment

Mahan and Roselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1950. [See Mahan's report] Hunt, newspaper, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.

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0002183

Rosselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Mahon and Council to discuss further details.

[Futures Report p 76; Office of Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov. 1970]

Although the Dwyer Oswald Report places the meeting at the Playa Station on 14 September 1960, Rosselli recalled that the ~~event~~ discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

Comment

Tony de Valma admits going to NY at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Rosselli at this time or [Futures of de Valma, that his visit had an assassination motivation]

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the D.C.I., it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Rosselli "agreed to introduce him (Mahon) to a friend, 'Sam Gold', who knew the Cuban crowd."

Comment:

The timing of the introduction of both ~~Frank~~ (Gold) and Traffim ("Joe") is ~~an~~ important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plots. According

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to the 1967 I.G. Report, the ~~entry~~ ^{entry} of bianca took place ^(a) during the week of 25 September 1960:.....

[1967 I.G. Report, p18]

In contrast, the SSC Inform Report at p.76, does not ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~that~~ ^{that} bianca is cited appearance ~~as~~ ^{as} ~~it was~~ ^{it was} "certainly prior to October 18." (p76) because of conflicting ~~testimony~~ evidence between the 1967 I.G. September date and Mahon's Senate testimony which set the introduction in ~~at~~ November 1960. As a compromise, the Inform Report reasoned that bianca had been introduced to the Mahon "prior to October 18" because the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October 30, 1960; and (2) ~~the~~ DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo dated 18 October 1960 which revealed an FBI FLSUR quoting bianca as discussing her involvement in an assassination plot against Castro. ^(b) FBI memo, dated 18 Oct 1960 from Horro to Bissell; Inform Report, p79]

[Comment: 0002184
Each ~~of~~ dual reasons listed in the Inform Report on p 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately in the below.]

[Comment: ~~SECRET~~
Although the 1967 I.G. Report said

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that "Mahon pointed out 'bold' to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either 'Fred' or 'Joe', the Intern Report disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "The Support Chief, who was using the name 'Tom J. Hs.', said he had met 'Sam' and 'Joe', once, and then very briefly S.O.C. 5/30/75, pp 26-29; Intern Report?

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Comment
~~Comment~~

Conflicts appear also on ~~a number of~~ several related minor points surrounding the September 1965 meeting in N.Y.C. and Miami. For instance:

1) Did Roselli learn from the report that ~~that~~ the speaker was CFA?
a) O'Connell stated that Mahon told Roselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Roselli testified that Mahon told him that O'Connell was CFA [Intern Report p 20]. Also, footnote 1 on p 26 indicates that Roselli told O'Connell "about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Boucassa, that "I am not kidding, I know what you work for".

The importance of Roselli's recognition of CFA ~~is~~ ^{SECRET} ~~is~~ ^{is} that it is doubtful if Boucassa and Tappan

could have been enlisted under they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

2) Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some summer critics of Wall Street that had... much interests and properties around Cuba..." (Roselli, 6/24/75 pp 9, 17)

CF. Jack Anderson column of Jan. 19, 1971, which stated that (4) Could the plot against Castro have backfired against Richard Kennedy? ... None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

Inf. Anderson's source for this attack were Roselli and ~~William~~ William Karry, who was not privy to the details of Phase F, it is another ~~example~~ ^{instance} of serious discrepancies between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson version which all purport to depend, in major degree, upon Roselli.

3) The alleged ~~"discovery"~~ "surprise discovery" by Mahomed O'Connell as to the ~~possible~~ identification of "Sambo" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, ~~all~~ although it is

possible that the Senate Committee staff overlooked the ^{Miami} newspaper

Sunday supplement (Pamphlet) which purportedly included pictures of persons and T. J. Mahan, their ~~relationship~~ ^{showing} the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Pamphlet magazine for the months of October and November. It would appear that ~~that~~ O'Connell and Mahan were looking for an ~~easy~~ ^{just} facts reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top Mafia in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the embryonic stage and no little was disclosed to Bonelli et al until approximately March 1961. Therefore the reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Pamphlet ^{in the Senate Papers} RTT, FBI

The principals in Phase D of the operation ~~with~~ also disagree as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold" and "Joe" in ~~Phase~~ the pre - Bay of Pigs phase of the operation.

"Although Mahan described Bonenna as playing a "key" role.

0002189

(Mahan, 7/29/75, p. 34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the mission". Roselli downplayed Brannan's part to that of a "back-up" man. (Roselli 6/24/75, p. 15) ~~All of the information also~~

In either Roselli received a message from Brannan's murder four days before Roselli's Senate appearance is open for question. J. Roselli's characterization of Brannan's role as minor ^{in contrast to} his alleged ^{recruitment of} ~~discovery of~~ Brannan's "knowledge of the Cuban word" which the 19 Nov. 1970 memo recorded.

Trafficking in involvement in Phase I is even more justified by the available evidence. The 1967 FBI Report and Senate Intern Report ~~say~~ state that "bold" identified "Joe" to Mahan as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there. (FBI Report p. 19; Intern Report, p. 775. To support the description of Traffante as a courier, the ~~1967 FBI Report~~ Intern Report quotes p. 19 of the 1967 FBI Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Traffante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana in syndicate business."

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Comment ^{factually}

This unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records ^{of other agencies}. As an example, State Department files reflect that Traffante applied for a passport ^{in Cuba} in October, 1959 and received that document in Havana on February 2, 1960. (See Traffante File, State Dept). ~~There is~~ ~~no~~ No records available to the Committee from DNS, State Department or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau ~~and State~~ maintained decent surveillance on Traffante during the period. In his Committee testimony, Traffante ~~recalled~~ ~~stated~~ that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed those sojourns within two or three months after his release ^{from prison}. Testimony, pp 4-53, Oct 2, 1978. His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos ^{in Havana} were either closed or operating in the mid-1960s, and law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently ~~visiting~~ during the pre-Payday Big game period.

By the time of the Senate testimony of Roselli, however, Traffante's role had diminished to a joint

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even below Giancana's. He had been reduced ^{from "courier"} to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate ~~carriers~~ ^{been} Roselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. Intuitively, Trafficante and Roselli 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dovetail well but remain in contradiction to the ~~my~~ facts as they were being reported in 1973 of the principals.

Comment:

The Senate testimony of Roselli and Trafficante needs to be outlined ~~specifically~~ with a view to contrasting the "courier is interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not vigorously cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Defense Report "hint" at the problem.]

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~of~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Agency took the simplistic, straight forward approach of shooting Castro but this plan was rejected

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by Bioncana. In a Comment
to its 1967 Report, the Inspector
General noted that "Bioncana
was flatly opposed to the use
of firearms. He said that no one
could be recruited to do the job
because the chance of survival
and escape would be negligible.
Bioncana stated a preference for
lethal pill that could be put
into Castro's food and drink.
Trafficante (Joe; the courier) was
~~in touch~~ in touch with a disloyal
Cuban official with access to
Castro and presumably of a sort
that would enable him to
surreptitiously poison Castro. The
gangsters named their man
inside as Juan Orta, who was
then office Chief and Director General
of the Office of the Prime Minister
Castro. The gangster said that
Orta had once been in a position
to receive backpacks from the
gangster infants but had since
lost that source of income and
needed the money. [F.B. Report, p 25]

Comment

Comment

The observation of the 1967 FO Report ~~has~~ ^{is} an ~~extremely~~ ^{of extreme} significance in several respects. First, the person put ~~at~~ ⁱⁿ ~~SECRET~~ ^{SECRET} ~~guard~~ ^{guard} ~~original~~ ^{original} with ~~Puncana~~, not the Agency; a point

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which is crucial to the final
conclusion presented below.

Secondly, Trappento is identified
as ~~providing~~ ^{having} access to, and
providing the ^{potential} assassin in Cuba
which is in consistent with
his self-serving role description
of "infiltrator." His ability to
recruit Ota apparently ~~is~~ was
directly tied to his former
gangster empire associations
which formed a constant pattern
for all his ~~illegal~~ conduct for Trappento both
during and after his Cuban days.
[See Trappento profile.]

Comment

note Speculation concerning Ota's
rise during the ~~the~~ Agency's 1977
Report when it was forced to
address a problem raised by
an April 23, 1975 article, concerning
Frank Stupis, written by Paul
Merkill of the New York Daily News.
Stupis was quoted as saying,
"The third (assassination) scheme
involved planting a bomb in Castro's
office. It had access to the Prime
Minister's office," Stupis said, "I knew
Fidel's private secretary, Juan Ota.
I recruited him to work with the
Embassy. I mean Embassy in Havana."
What was his hook to the

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writes of the 1977 Report was the fact that Onta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Stugis with Trafficante and with a "gambling partner" of Trafficante, Norman Rothman (See Rothman Papers). Coupled with Stugis' ^{alleged} past relationships, is the allegation that Stugis had a role in ~~an~~ inspecting the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an interest with Onta in running gambling "high roller".

A second aspect of Muskie's ~~the~~ news series concerned a claim by Martha Jorony that she had acted on behalf of Stugis in 1960 in attempt to poison Castro who dove tailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Domonici electronically surveilled curriculum in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' ^{SECRET} some drink or food of Castro" (Memo, Hiram to DCI, 10/14/60).

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...

Additional considerations:

1. Criminal syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own undiscovered prior to CPTA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been Agency was CPTA unaware of same in 1962 April.
2. Syndicate operators could have had contacts such as those in New York Daily News Story in 1975 and 1976.
3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.
4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He professed know Ochoa in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Ochoa arranged roll of assassin.

If there was an earlier operation w/ Ochoa, it was not CPTA; it could have been earlier operation of syndicate. Sturgis could have been or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from Mexico in 1965 after Cuba withdrew there.

Neither the 1967 I-C Report
or the SSC Interim Report can

pinpoint the precise date on which
the Agency processed the poison pills
which O'Connell delivered to Rosselli
{ Interim Report, p 80. The chain of
custody, according to the 1967 I-C-
Report ~~was~~ was for the lethal
pills to be delivered from Rosselli
to Truffante. Although the next
intervening steps remain a
mystery, Rosselli reports to O'Connell
that the pills had been delivered to
Data in Cuba in late February - early
March 1961. { Interim Rpt, p 27; Interim Rpt p 80

Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported
the version of Joe Shimon ~~whose~~
~~story~~ whose memory was that the
money and pills for the operation were
delivered at a meeting at the Fontainebleau
Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by
"Makum, Rosselli, Truffante, and the
Cubans". { Interim Rpt p 15. Shimon's
~~memory~~ story is filled with
verid ~~into~~ details which are documented
on p 2 of the Report, but his credibility
is subject to serious question as
his account is not shared by
anyone else connected with the plan
and nor is his relationship with

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0002198 Roselli, biancano, or Trafficante appear as "copy" as he would lead one to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for ~~John~~ ^{John} Williams column of January 9, 1961, which fixed the date of the passage of the person at the Fourtanblet ^{by Roselli} as March 13, 1961, and confirmed the report that Castro became ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shimon's stay is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Ota could or would not, attempt the poisoning; a fact apparently unknown to Shimon before his "leak" to Truman and his Senate testimony.]

Comment

One additional fact concerning Ota's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the final thesis of this report. Ota lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while ~~the~~ planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington.

It would seem though, that the gangster did know that Ota had already lost his access to Castro [~~the~~ 1967 ~~W.~~ Report p. 27]

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With the failure of Onto
to produce the desired results,

the project was at a standstill
until, once again, Santo Trappante
assumed command. Roselli has

that "Trappante believed
a certain leading figure in
the Cuban exile movement ~~etc~~ might
be able to accomplish the assassination
Σ Feb 1967 DC Lpt, p 29; Daken Rpt p 80.

Comment:

The well known leader was, of course
Tony de Vanna, ~~the~~ who was the subject of speculation
in an FBI memorandum of 18 Jan 1961
incriminating him with receiving foreign
aid from American gangsters for
anti-Castro activities which were
the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction
into the CIA mob plots, de Vanna was already
being funded by the Agency through
the Revolutionary Front and was heavily
involved in CIA planning for the
Bay of Pigs invasion which was
imminent.

De Vanna was also ^{being} ~~used~~
by Mike McRaney whose address
agency was ~~SECRET~~ engaged in
promoting Vanna's image in
collaboration with McRaney from
in 1960-61

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0002260 "Chirri" or "Chillo" Mendezal Mendez
is discussed in Tupper's FBI files
as a close Cuban associate.

Completing the picture of
support for Varona is the promotion
efforts of the Dins and Eddie
Cullini, McHenry and Ramsey Gusman
associates, who were reportedly
working through a Washington DC,
public relations firm, Edward
K. Moss and Associates. Moss had
previous CPTA associations and
was supposed acting as a conduit
for funds supplied by the Cullini
brothers with the understanding
that their group would have
"privileged treatment" in the
Cuba of the future. Attempts
to refute these reports were
unsuccessful. [1967 FBI Report
p. 30]

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The Danish influence
using the Cullini brothers as a
"front" is particularly interesting
in light of Varona's admission
that Jorge Pujol arranged a
meeting in Miami in ~~the summer~~ 1960 wherein ^{my} Danish offered to
financially "back" Varona's
efforts to ~~assist~~ "educate"
the Cuban people about Castro,
which may be a euphemism for
anti-Castro plots. [See Varona transcript]

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The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency ~~and~~ engaged crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Vanna, ^{proving independent} as an individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~various~~ multitude of exile groups who were in a continual internecine feud. de Vanna was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S. government and criminal syndicates to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors.

[See Vanna testimony -]

Although de Vanna has no ^{direct} memory of meeting Traffante, the Tampa crime boss admits that he acted as an "outsider" in several meetings attended by de Vanna, Roselli, Bernama, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael, "Macho" Penar, a Traffante gambling partner from Havana who continued to serve Traffante in Miami during the 1960s. Traffante claimed that Roselli had primary control over Penar but this appears unlikely in view of Traffante's long-standing ^{SECRET} friendship with Penar on Cuba. And Roselli's admission to

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0002202 O'Connell that ~~Trappanese~~ Trappanese would provide the replacement for the ill-fated, Juan Orta who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

Comment: ^{Paralleling} ~~Paralleling~~ the situation at the Senate hearings July 1975 when Roselli's depiction of Trappanese's role ~~changed~~ changed from ~~his~~ his "counsel" ~~character~~ ^{character} ~~in 1960~~ in 1960 as reported by the Agency to conform to Trappanese's "interpreter" state ment, in the recent interview with Cener who agrees with Trappanese's Committee testimony ^{with de Vanna} he was an ^{with de Vanna} ~~interpreter~~ ^{with de Vanna} ~~for~~ ^{with de Vanna} Roselli. ~~and~~ the net result in both instances is to minimize Trappanese's exposure (See C.F. Fonzi interview with Cener, May 3, 1978 and Trappanese testimony, Oct 7, 1977)

~~However, the meeting with~~
~~Vanna came to pass, the~~
~~ambiguity~~
If ~~ambiguity~~ exists as to the ^{ambiguity} introduction of de Vanna into Phase one of the Castro assassination plot, more ~~than~~ ~~ambiguity~~ confusion surrounds de Vanna's ~~as~~ actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The I & Report indicates that de Vanna attempted a second gun run before the Cuban invasion that Roselli was positive that only one

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attempt, (Ortas) was made. He was also positive that he delivered both pills, money and supplies to de Vanna which is corroborated by O'Connell ~~points~~ during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculating that only one pre-Pray of Pigs attempt was made, and that... [de Vanna] was the contact in the United States who arranged for... [Ortas]... to administer the poison.

Comment

There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Vanna's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Vanna denies ever having received poison pills from Roselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time. [See Vanna transcript]

Comment

The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Vanna participate in the mob's plot while ~~in~~ employing his part on the Peruvian Canal. However, "Steps ^{which} taken to end his participation in the syndicate plan but [they] were apparently ineffective".

W.I.C. Report, p 325

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Phase II

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, but it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Roselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and O'Connell swore that Harvey "took over a going operation". [I.C. Rept p 33] The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be discerned~~ has not been uncovered, but Roselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~was~~ in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous *de l'homme* was to provide the ~~individuals~~ who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant ~~important~~ differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and

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success in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

Fact. In Phase One, Roselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the manner of the assassination was deliberately vague. After ~~Harry~~ Harry met Roselli in Miami in April 1962, Harry reported that "the manner in which the attack material was to be introduced into Castro's food (which involved) an asset of Vauma who had access to some in a restaurant frequented by Castro." By June 1962 after the Vauma had received money and instructions from the JMWAVE station and had personally sent the pills into Cuba, ~~the~~ "Roselli" reported to Harry on 21 June that Vauma had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harry said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harry never heard

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work for Pearson and did know
that Anderson had more than a
passing acquaintance with Morgan.
- Morgan also fought with
Pat Coyne of N 82

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their names or anything about them"
 [1967 DO. Report p513]

Comment

As the 1967 DO author correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" personifying opportunity ~~was the same place that Edwards~~ was familiar in "that Edwards had decided precisely the same plan". The fact that Vauma related the exact modes operandi to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

- (1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or
- (2) the mob had been using di Vauma before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and prompted the CDA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
- (3) di Vauma was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain ^{their} financial backing or in response to directives from organized crime.

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Second

The cast of underworld

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character changed. Harvey had insisted that Mahue and Bencaan be dropped from the operation which Roselli readily acceded to. Trafficante's "in person" role was assumed by "Marco", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the name Barack Bonny and today.

Comment

"Marco" introduction into one of the most sensitive C.I.A. covert actions in history without any attempt ^{by the Agency} to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently went blithely to bed ~~to~~ ^{with} ~~the~~ ^{two} of the top hoodlums in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the R.F.B. Report characterizes Marco as "Roselli's man," it is probable that this individual was ~~never~~ drafted by Trafficante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

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2. "mafia" ^{was} plots slow and undramatic.
Rosselli, in May 1962, reported to
Hany that the jets and guns which
had been delivered to Varma in Miami
in April had arrived in Cuba, and an
unidentified three-man team had been dispatched
in June to execute the plan [Interim Report
p845]

7. During September 1962, ~~and~~ Rosselli
related to Hany that de Varona brother
leading a second three-man team
who were "supposedly military men
whose assignment was to penetrate
Castro's body guard. During this period
the 'medicene' was reported as still in
place and the three men of the first
team safe [1962 Interim Report, p51]
However, the second team never
made Cuba and a series of alibis
were constructed during December and
January 1963. Nevertheless, de Varona
supposedly collected \$200 for the maintenance
of these individuals from Rosselli
who had received the payment from
Hany. [1962 Interim Report p52]

In mid-July 1963 both
Hany and Rosselli agreed that "nothing
was happening and that there was
not much chance that anything would
happen in the future" [1962 Interim Report p52]
Rosselli was instructed to ease
his way out of touch with
Varona which ~~he~~ ^{he} ~~did~~ ^{did}.
The last meeting between Hany

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and Roselli occurred in Washington
D.C. in June 1963. When he was
Havens' ~~guest~~ ~~for~~ overnight guest. Hence
their meeting ostensibly was not directly
related to any assassination plots.

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CONCLUSION

0002210

in part, the available evidence suggests that ~~the thesis~~ the thesis which is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Directorate General Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CTR singly found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. ... On a ~~large~~ ^{small} scale, CTR may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." [1977 DG Rpt p 208]

the relevant evidence is as follows

1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Biancana ET SUR:

... Biancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions. ... Biancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further named, to drop a 'pill' in some fruit or food of Castro. [1977 DG Rpt p 193]

Comment

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Although the reported meetings between Mahon, Donelli, and Pennington

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are subject to different interpretation,
it is clear that no plans were
developed between the parties ~~any~~
until sometime after October 1, 1961.
The date of the ^{FREES} intercepted conversation of
Biancana.

The grim pills, prepared by the
CPTA at Biancana's request, were
not ready for delivery until late
February - early March 1961, so that it
is difficult to see how Biancana's
November 1960 assassination plot
could be a part of the CPTA operation.
Rather, it appears that the mob had
its own plan in progress, using
a mixture of Castro, to accomplish the
 deed, when the CPTA fortuitously
happened along to offer its support.
The mob was then in a perfect
position. If their ~~present~~ private
plot actually worked and Castro died,
then the Syndicate had enormous
Machinist potential against the CPTA
which it could exercise at the
opportune moment. However, if their
~~plot~~ back-fired, then their position
would be that they were
not attempting to execute the
wishes of their Government.

intrigue

Additional Comment

The action of Biancana's
"hired hand", Richard Cain ~~was~~
~~not to~~ raise some interesting
possibilities. Brian Cain's admission

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to the FBI that he had ~~been~~ joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on ~~prisoner's~~ payroll. Cain's approach to ~~the~~ the CPTA Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer ~~his services~~ information in the Cuban community appears ~~as a little more than~~ coincidental. Then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (and me stay), and to "bug" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for St-Paul Prio (second stay) the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by someone to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain called me the "arranger to be" plan because I used to in the ~~1950s~~ ^{1940s} CPTA, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

I tie in memo on Cain with Salomon's view which strongly supports the inference, that Cain was the "missing second man" in the Los Vegas writing of Oct 30, 1960. Mahan needs to be questioned on this point.

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CPTA during 1961-1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the DPT Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency. In Chicago, Cuba

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0002213

was the former head of the Directorate
in Cuba when he was a major.
~~He~~ former in deposing Batista.

In September 1963, Cain reported
to the Chicago office of the CIA that
DRB was in a deal to purchase
a large arms shipment. He was
told by the Agency to "get out
of the picture" ~~with~~ a dispatch
which is subject to several interpretations
including the fact that the CIA
was a willing participant in the deal.

Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain
now the chief investigator for Cook
County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency
some information that Oswald was
in ~~Cuba~~ Chicago in Sept 1963 with
the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and
had purchased the ~~massacre~~
up in March 1963.

2. Recruitment of ~~potential~~ ^{the potential} Assassins

In ~~including~~ ^{the potential} ~~poisoner~~,
Giancana spoke of a "girl" who
was close to Castro while the
individual recruited for the CIA pills
was Juan Orta, a secretary in
Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred
to by Giancana can never be ascertained
but Trafficante was clearly in the
best position to recruit ~~at least one~~
one of Castro's Cuban ministers due to
his multitudinous contacts in the
Cuban gambling and prostitution circles

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000221A

It was common for American gangsters to have Cuban mistresses and Traffickers, Rothman, and Torrence were typical examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to arriving at the Nacional Hotel (owned by Mike McManis) seven or eight on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Traffickers to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.

El Manita Torony is a unassuming woman, to say the least, and her potential as an assassin recruited by Frank Stupis has been previously discussed. However, one extremely important point is that she was also Charles Torrence's mistress and, thus, could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Torrence is totally uncooperative but Torony was not asked about her relationship with Torrence in Cuba so that we do not know the dated match.

Comment

— Juan Ortiz, the man identified to the Agency as the gangster's contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably involved by Traffickers, but to date former receipt of gangster "kickbacks". One fact is extremely bothersome however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's involvement in using Ortiz to execute the assassination plan. According to the ~~SECRET~~ FBI Report L-1002.

Ota "lost his position in the Puerto Rican Office in January 1961, which planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington." According to the official version Ota accepted for the pills in late February-early March 1961 and kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them" [1967 FBI Rpt p 273]

7. If the mob was close enough to Ota to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Ota had lost his position of necessity. The other possibility is that the pills were left in the United States and then were available to him at a time when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the Bay for its ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase II of the operation which began in April 1962, ~~there is~~ the same possibilities exist. If Hany and O'Connell are correct in assuming that Hany had walked into an "ongoing operation, then ~~it is~~ ~~that~~ be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Verna, which predated the CIA participation according to the FBI 5 minutes 21 Dec 1960, and 18 January 1961 had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs ~~with the receipt~~

it can

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0092217 business more in
continuing the paramilitary attempts
against Castro in a substantive way.
There still was a percentage in
"stringing the Agency along." First, there
was no expense to the syndicate
because the Agency was providing full
logistical support for Urova. Second,
there was the mounting pressure
from the ~~State~~ FBI and Justice Department
which had to be blunted, if possible.
No better weapon to accomplish this
goal could be found than to use
one agency (CIA) against another (FBI).
A brief look at the record shows the
employment of ~~this~~ strategy ~~at~~ at moments
of crisis for those who participated in
the plots.

1. Robert Mahon

- Quasi-Long Committee subpoena
in 1966 [Intern Report, p 79, note 3; Internal Security
P Morgan]
- solidification of position with
CIA and with Hughes Department
[Hughes was definitely told of the project of Mahon
in Nov. 1960, and was himself involved in an
alliance with the CIA which in fact, occurred
later when Mahon was Hughes' principal agent?]
[Intern Report, p 75, note 2; Mahon Security, Turkey?]
- Dispute with Hughes; See memo 20 May 1971
in office of Security File on Internal P Morgan]

2. John Roselli

- evading criminal prosecution [Intern
Report, p 55, note 4,
- use in ~~several~~ legal moves in March 1971 to
attempt to reduce sentence
- ~~was~~ attempts to delay deportation
hanging with JNS which included

0002218

Jack Anderson's personal intervention
with PRS (See Anderson interview, and
CFA Roselli's file; ~~re~~ CFA office
of Security file re Edward P. Morgan)

3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 - wiretap in Las Vegas
where Giancana got Mafiosi to take the heat
for him by blaming the tap was a
result of the CFA plots.

- Early 1962, intervention with FNU
Farrell of DNS re possible deportation
[See Tab C, Roselli CFA File,
stating that inf. I Swab, Osborn, Peyton
Rocca, & Houston know]

- attempts to ward off FPD surveillance
in 1963 & 1967 [D.C. Report p 129]

- Communication with Sam Papich
on 3 May 1967, Sam comments that
Roselli and Giancana have CFA
'over a barrel' because of "that operation".
He said that he doubted that the FBI
would be able to do anything about either
Roselli or Giancana because of their
previous activities with your people."
[1967 F.B. Rpt p 137]

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Notes re Jack Anderson
"Castro Retaliation" theory,

0002219

March 3, 1967 }
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson Office

Source:

1967 I.B. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients

(p 124)

- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked

(p 120)

- Impact

71 The Rosselli-bannon impact in far Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that bannon may also have been this (p 122)

- Mahan

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does have good reasons for not wanting the story aired further. Unfortunate publicity might cause him to lose his discretion

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Client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Roselli and Wags Lichten.

- The Pearson story, which is now carrying so much distress, includes one detail that is not found in Phase Two: the three-man team
Comment

Not necessary since Pearson was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the 3-man team initially and may have Roselli on the concept in Phase Two or Roselli just didn't mention the 3-man team to Mahan or O'Connell during Phase I
Comment

- In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a link to Pearson, Agency makes the following point:

If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help. Ep 123

Since Agency can figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Roselli is drinking too much and ~~the~~ talking to Morgan who is also drinking and likely to be engaged to Pearson.

Comment

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Even Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best gordies: the story of the pills

and the fact of the State Dept. meeting,
GOC22222 P 1275
Comment

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See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson
claims to have a report that there
was a high-level meeting at the
Dept of State at which plans for the
assassination were discussed."

I-6 speculates that Pearson is
talking about the 10 August 72 meeting of
the Special Group (Signal) which was
attended by Harvey. (p 112)

Σ R F K was not present

2. Other Sources

a) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCD aware that Russell
was going to expose plots. He "decided
to ignore his threats and take a
calculated risk as to the consequences
that may occur with the disclosure
of his story. This was subsequently done
by Russell or someone in his belief
furnishing Jack Braden details of the
incident."

(Memo in office of Security full re Morgan)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971

Subject: Excluded

Mr. ^{He} Please (from CIA & new with Excluded)
said Mahen & Braden together on some
oil mix deal. ... Recent exposure of
Braden re Mahen roll on the Carter
Revolution was a deliberate exposure
instigated by Robert Mahen using
his son Peter as an intermediary.

Please' theory is that Mahan probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (re. Intell in re new CIA stuff to influence Hughes)

-Magan makes noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement with CIA
Σ Memo in Security File re Magan

4. Memo 19 Nov 1970

-Hany had contacts with Roselli in November - December 1967 and Jan 1968 following Roselli conviction -
- 17 Nov 1970

Magan had received a call from Tom Wadden who requested Roselli that Roselli faced deportation and would blow story. DCF decided to ignore threat and Mahan agreed.

"Mahan further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it reflected him personally."

5. 19 Dec. 1967

-Summary conversation instigated by Hany on Roselli's behalf to get CIA interested directly or at least ensure new govt case against Roselli was.

- Calls from Roselli began on October 6 Hany.. Roselli knew what Agency had done for Mahan with Sen. Long because SA Magan told

Roselli

- Also, the Director Belmont had sent Harry a news clipping re Agency use of Bincon (journalist the Bryant 1963 Chicago story of Sandy Smith)

Roselli said the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- J. Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Bincon story

- Mahan admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase P operation due to Agency delaying on long committed subpoenas

- Mahan visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Mahan) had been identified as the "client" ~~story~~ Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity affecting his relationship with Hughes, with Roselli

- Mahan denied discussing latter phase of inman & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962

- Roselli met Morgan through Hunt Reenspur in the 1950s

- Mahan recalled that Morgan and Roselli met with Baum in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the ~~suppose~~ impression that Roselli sought legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances

- Roselli under pressure from FBI during hearings had a 49 yr old girl

- Belvid Morgan had done some

January 6th

15 Jan 1977

0002225

Memo re request of Dade City
investigator for information on
3 Cubans:

1. a. Ramon Dom Estevan
b. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
c. Luciano Nueves
d. Jose de la Torre
e. Jose Quintana
f. Joaquin Brito Cortez
g. Manolo Artime
h. M.L.H.

2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in
Roselli (SSCP) testimony.

Two names mentioned in a 9 Dec
1970 Office of Security memo

v. No background investigation done on
Roselli or Brancard

vi. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect
between Roselli's Agency opponents reported
approx. 1971.

12. O'Connell has always been informed
by Dade City.

2. Office of Security has no such
evidence (that Cuban Fulbrighter Sena may have
been involved or Cuban agents in Miami area
during time of his death)

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0002225

Nieves

- c. Released in March 1965 after serving approx 16 months of a 20 yr sentence for anti-Castro plot; went to Spain briefly where he was of interest to Madrid Station
- August 1965 entered US
 - Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational interest to DDO

Shurin

He is mentioned in the John Roselli file as a personal friend of Roselli. It is further noted that Shurin knew Roselli but nature & extent of their official/social relationship unknown

30 August 1976 report by S/A Edward C. Rudiger, Alexandria FPD office.

- Cuban contacts of Roselli

1. Juan Ota

was an official of the Centro Oper circa 1960-61 and was a contact of Santos Trafficante. Ota was reportedly solicited by Trafficante to make the assassination attempt against Castro.

2. Tony Vanna

When Juan Ota was not successful in carrying out the mission against Castro, Trafficante suggested Vanna be used. Roselli contacted Vanna. Vanna was to use

SECRET

assets of his son to carry out the mission. Varona also reportedly used his son's influence to assist him in this effort but there is no identifying info in regard to the mission.

3. Roselli had a man, also presumably in Miami, known to Harvey as "Macco", who also used the names Garcia Conny and Godoy. Harvey was unable to identify Macco, who was described as Cuban who spoke Italian.

517-339-3523 F. No info in regard to death or welfare parents agent Roselli or Cuban in G1 or Mexico, Venezuela - Tropic, SUMMA, or MURPHY inc/

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf. The DCP decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur by the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack & William details of the incident.

0002229

Memo 20 May 1971

Subject: Inter Tel

OFC

Magan had been engaged by Rayhan Tol to pursue the Makini efforts. (H Pearce from Agency memo Inter Tel new, said Magan may advise to certain Agency officials, that they had better take it easy on Makin because of his past involvement w/ LIT.

I John Southard - in 1942-44 was in touch w/ Makin & simultaneously worked out details of a [redacted] arrangement w/ Aircraft Div of Hyde Tel.

For past several years Magan had been paid [redacted]

In May 10, 1971 Mr. Pearce said Makin & Androm are involved together in some oil field deals. I would look into this and other such smaller matters to trace the source & disposition of funds. Recent exposure by Androm re Makin's role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robt. Makin using his son Peter as an intermediary. Pearce's theory is that Makin prob. that such publicity would 'scare them off'. The Inter Tel staff is aware of a series of contacts & meetings between Peter Makin and Jack Androm or a member of his staff.

SECRET

19 Nov 1970

For: D C I

Suly Roselli, Johnny

2. In Sept 1960, Mr. Richard M. Russell approached Col. Sheffeld Edwards to inform of the office of Security had assets that may amount to a sensitive mission requiring govt-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

5. Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one J R on several occasions while visiting. He only knew him casually thru. contacts, but was given to understand that he was a "high ranking member of the 'squad' and controlled all of the old money matters in the shop."

Mahan would know, if R was in fact a member of the Club, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban family interests.

6. Mahan to approach R who knew M as a private banker, private & frequent visitor.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at H/H/H Playhouse. His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved but, thru M's persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend Sam Bold who knew the Cuban crowd. "No money required or paid."

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Mahan introduced to Sam Stagg at the Fontainebleau. It was several weeks after his meeting w/ Sam and Joe, who was identified

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0002232

to him as a courier operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade

9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving back-bite payments from the guerrilla units, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.

11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of repeated attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success.

12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Gregory Shuman had become disaffected w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the fight and was willing to handle the mission thru his own resources.

13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given \$10,000 for organizational expenses & time for compensation

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secret may RFR on documents away up
to make in report on report. At our report previously
dropped.
17. May 1962 Harry told me as Case
officer & it is not known by this office
whether R was used equitably from
that point on

0002233

17. Illegal entry Nov. 1967
18.2 Dec 1968 R secretly of Fudan.
19. Harry reported to office of Harry his
contacts w/ R in Nov - Dec 1967 & Jan 1968.
It was his belief that John W. N. Schacht
the Agency for constitution in deportation
unless he actually forced deportation.
R expressed confidence that he would win
an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.

Mahm called O Connell to advise
that Mahm's attorney, Ed Morgan, had
rec'd a call from Tom Wadden who stated
appeal exhausted & R forced deportation.

If someone did interfere on R's
behalf, he would make a complete
expose of his activities in Agency

21. 18 Nov 1970. DCF Engh & Deat
not to arrest R. Mahm was so
advised of Agency's position & he was in
complete agreement w/ our stand. He further
advised that he was not concerned about
any publicity as it appeared quickly.

Anders H. Bell June 18, 1971

to attorney's should know; but return on a

SECRET

stop; last of Feb or first of March 1963
 March 13, 1961 R delivered capsules to his
 contact at Fontainebleau
 - a few weeks later contact with

0602255

Feb 23, 1971

Once he called on the racket boss
 Sam Giancana to line up a contact.
 The confidential files report that he had
 "gambly interest and an interest in the
 shrimp business in Cuba". However, the
 Chi gangster took no direct part in the
 assassination plot.

19 Dec 1967

Memo For Record

Telephone conversation Harry & Howard Osborn

2. The fact revealed Dir of Security
 the subject of our last written communica-
 re. J.R. the validity of the Justice Dept case
 against him; & whether or not the J. Edgar
 to consider any possible intervention on
 his behalf

3. Harry indicated that he thought the
 way of "sitting tight" might be alright,
 but that he felt it would be a simple
 matter for the Dir to see Howard personally
 & determine on an unofficial basis
 what actual case the Justice Dept had.

Osborn - speculates Harry trying to
 find out validity of case for purpose of
 how to work for Mayor

SECRET

11 Dec 1967

1. Harry reported London meeting w/ Papich on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 26 Nov. 1967. R calls Harry. who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.

27 Nov, they "bumped" into Jim Byrd & Harry told R as "Mr. Ralston."

28 Nov Spent 11 hours at Portland

4. Harry to Harry, County Club.

R in town to see Morgan re a radio station in San Jose. Not worked re order which he brought.

- R said he had not seen anyone since 1965 (Papich checking & may respond to Harry)

- R & n state or imply that he wanted help from Agency.

6. Goly told Harry re London meeting w/ Col. Edwards in 1964 & Harry meeting O'Connell had w/ Moller & R in Cal when he returned from duty in Taiwan.

7. Harry insists that he must know status of case. If it is a good case, Harry feels the Agency must exert influence to have the subject "billed". If it is not a good case, that Harry will tell Goly & he will recall it as well.

10. Harry independent as regarding his interest was more than to protect Agency.

SECRET

00022.37

He had my the highest regard for ~~Harry~~
and the way we had handled his problem.

8 Nov 1967

R. Harry is source

R called on Oct 22nd & 27th. But
Harry refused to swear R's attorney
- R wondered if Nyong could not
do as much for him as it did for Mahan.
Ed Morgan knew what Nyong did for Mahan
w/ Sen. Long & had told Jolly about this.

4 Oct 67

Osborn & Harry at lunch.

- R quite vehement & bitter re
Mahan indirectly Mahan would "sell anyone
down the river to protect his interest."

- Dor had sent Harry news clipping
re use of banana. R said leak came
from Sen. Kennedy's office when he was still for

Eyes Only Mahan

28 April 67

1. ~~Conrad~~ - Morgan allegedly contacted some high level
officials in govt indirectly he had a client
who had been involved in an espionage matter.
~~Mahan~~ recalled & said he had told Morgan
when Nyong delays on Long subpoena.

2. Mahan surely upset to find if he
had been identified as client source

SECRET

0002238 publicity on his relationship w/ Hayes.

5. No knowledge of mission after April 1946
& never discussed latter phases w/ R
6. Mahan - R met Magon thru Pearson
in 1950's when Magon was legal work
for Lai Vagan Sun.

R & Magon in Vegas sometime in
March. John Pearson in town "it was Mahan's
recollection that these individuals spent
some time together. He was under the
impression that they sought legal advice
from Magon but did not have other
conversations.

7. Claimed R had daughter rapidly
dwindling; 11 yr old girl & advised of ^{Shirley} name
for father to register. R putting pressure
for Mahan to hire his funds.

8. Believed Magon had done some
work for Pearson & did know that Pearson
had more than a passing acquaintance w/
Magon.

Magon fight w/ Pat Coyne for
NSA.

9. Knows only heavy problem w/ the
FBI but don't know details.

10. It is evident that Mahan is deeply
concerned about possibility of being identified
w/ Castro project. but placed cooperation w/
to deny involvement

SECRET

002232

Sen Long Mahu

Sherman, Long's personal atty, told him
that Mahu would be away.

7 June 66

Mahu reported by Morgan is daily
w/ St Louis atty, a personal friend of Long,
re Mahu's appearance -

3. Furstwald. had identified some
names, etc by name to O Connell &
Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sam, Ed Dubois
& a couple of his technicians now aware
of Mahu's tie-in w/ Hancock.

31 May 1966

Mahu asked if "Sam grant" was in
the unit

12. Morgan had advised Mahu that he
knew Long's personal atty who exerts great
influence on Long. They flew to St Louis
& then the 3 men flew to D.C. & met
w/ Long & Furstwald. Furstwald
wanted Mahu as his "man in the suit"
so that Mahu could do some good appeal
for T.V. Also that Mahu was not good
enough to make a bid. When Long saw
this, Furstwald would proceed.

13. Mahu claims name of Mahu is

SECRET

Sam thru a series of circumstances
 that were planned at our request.
 The then R.D. RFX was orally
 briefed on the background and led up
 to Mikul's involvement as Top Secret
 document furnished to Justice Dept
 which served as a backup of the
 supply

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p3

Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Govt attitude toward the Cuban reg.

a. Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug. 1960, w/ one possible exception, were aimed off at discrediting Castro personally. by inflating his behavior or by attacking his appearance.

b. August 1960 to April 1961

Plots aggressively pursued; viewed of at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime completely in BOP.

c. April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun by BOP was called off after BOP & remained dormant for several months.

d. Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme reactivated in early 1962 & pushed vigorously in era of Monrovia.

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After monrovia & collapse of Project MONROVIA, aggressive scheme begun by BOP; revived in April 1962; were finally terminated early 1963.

p6 Drew Pearson column of 2 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Castro.

He also has info:

- a) State Dept meeting at which assassination discussed
b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ pills

SECRET

5. If ~~syndicate~~^{SECRET} ~~indulging~~ its own
opinions, tends to reinforce thought
that details named have been
characterized by direction or security despite
FBI Oct 1942 report.

148 Final Report requires that sub
plots have no relation in a practical
thing

Ruby - Transferee

Other Reported Assassination Proposals

5 agent messages were identified that
made reference to plans to kill Castro or
proposing such action. Three of the
messages related to the same operation
the other two relating to separate
proposals; there is no indication
that any of these proposals was the
result of CIPA initiative.

PROBANC 15. Sumner 29 May 1962
and was released 30 August 62. He has
been reported as never admitting that
he was a CIPA agent. His name not
given to me. Three other were

0002243

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AMHAST

0002244

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SSC

1) inferre that AMHAST a custo agent
with the mean of providing a plot against Castro
so that Castro had justification for retaliation;

or

2) AMHAST so indicate the details would have
been known thus providing Castro

what he should have been reported to W.C.

Agony - The character of the relationship
between CIA and AMHAST, prior to Oswald
murder of President Kennedy, was so insubstantial
and inconclusive that it provided no basis for
AMHAST to feel that he had any tangible
CIA support for plotting against Castro.

..... there was little for him to
report or leak?

Comment p 5

Over a year passed between August
1962 and Sept 1963 when he was next
contacted by CIA. In terms of the
relationship that he had with CIA the
critical period, since is therefore between
5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963.

Reason for failure is plain.
CF 13
Could report AMHAST if a name Cuba; he was
uncontacted due to his potential.

SECRET

SECRET

0002245

Cable on Sept 7th says "HMLASH ~~very~~
totally spoiled but who will always
be a control problem.

... is best approached as a
chief conspirator allowed to recruit
his own cohorts among whom we
may then find persons susceptible
to long distance and covert designs.

Clearly, at that point, when HMLASH
was viewed as potentially important, he
was also viewed as a person of uncertain
loyalties, requiring careful but long
range developments for whatever course
of action that might later ensue.

p3-4 of SSC Summary and Findings, present
HMLASH as an ~~unreliable~~ plot
& inferred is that Carter Sept 7th
speech might have been a result of leak
by HMLASH

p10 "The fact remains that whatever
views HMLASH/11 may have expressed, he
had no response from his CIA contacts
of any support for his proposals at that time.

Fitzgerald meeting should be reported
high-power up w/ ~~self~~ ~~rights~~

SECRET

14 Nov Am WHIP reported that M.L.H. satisfied w/ policy considerations but unhappy over fact he had not been given technical assistance. He can understand why he had not been given "Cuban small piece" of equipment which presented a final solution to the problem.

Comment

In essence he [M.L.H.] was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While that may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a govt, it is directly relevant to the question of what M.L.H. was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (p. 18) to the effect that it was not clear how M.L.H. interpreted the put-off of U.S. aid.

After July 1964 FBI Report states that M.L.H. unhappy with CIA action and H.S. Kennedy had refused to support M.L.H.

19 Nov 63 Fitzgerald "approved" telling M.L.H. he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache

SECRET

0002248

could, if he requested it, include...
high-power reflect w/ scope...

19 Nov. MURKIN tells CIA he is
returning to Cuba.

Request by headquarters to ask him
to delay for 1 more meeting.

MURKIN agrees "if it is smug
intensity"

p 19 SSC speculates that this is fact
indicating he might receive specific support
from - at best a piece of highly
speculative analysis, not supported by
the evidence.

[Fails to mention per w/ reflecting
Opinion

M H. [redacted]

p 26

"A"

"unaware of MURKIN 1963 association
with CIA"

His info at least 1 1/2 years old;
after death of JFK; no idea of 1963
CIA ties w/ MURKIN what were
my inclination

SECRET

SECRET

0002251

c. CFA trace (first in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied detail pills to US gambly syndicate members... The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 passed of gambly rep. to a Cuban wife leader in Fla who in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the wife leader reported that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

of ... while the events described of New Orleans did occur & are subject to being patched together as the one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unproven.

Q18: During the week of 25 Sept 1960, O'Connell & Mahan went to Miami where Roselli introduced my father to "Sam Gold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Mahan pointed out "Gold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or "Joe".

Q19: At that time the gambly career was still operating in Cuba. Truffante was making regular trips between Miami & Havana as syndicate runner.

SECRET

0002252

p. 24 Despite the ~~delusion~~ ^{SECRET} that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.

(Comment - Giamena was fully opposed to the use of poisons. He said that no one could be trusted to do the job because the chance of survival's escape would be negligible. Giamena stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Trag. (Joe; the courier was on touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and personally of a sort that would enable him to smuggle poison Castro. The gangster named this man as Juan Ochoa who was then Officer Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister. The gangster said that Ochoa had once been in a position to receive blackmail from the gambling interests, had since lost that source of income and needed the money.)

p. 27. Late Feb - March 1961

As passed the pills to Trag. Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Ochoa in Cuba. Ochoa is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before using them. According to the gangster, Ochoa got cold feet.

Comment Ochoa lost his position on 8 Mar

SECRET

SECRET

offered on 26 Jan. 1961, while getting for the
operation was still going on in Miami & Washington.
He took refuge in the Singapore Embassy
0002254 April, 1961....

... It would seem that, that the
gangster did know that Vita had already
sent his account to Castro.

p 30. The Cuban brothers were believed to be
in touch with Vanna. Some men were
reported to have offered Vanna large sums
of money for his operations against Castro, with
the understanding that they would receive
privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the future".
Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p 31. Traff approached Vanna and told him
that he had clients who wanted to do work with
Castro & that they would pay big money for the
commit.

Roselli said as a loyal person he would
whatever he could & would never divulge
the operation.]

p 31. R wrote deliver money to Vanna for expenses.
- O'Connell recalls 50,000; Edwards recalls
25,000; Panunzio recalls 25,000

p 32 Roselli gave the gifts and money to Vanna. Roselli
dealt with ^{SECRET} under a pseudonym. Little
is known of the delivery channels beyond Vanna

SECRET

p. 32 ²² Edwards recalls something about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by Castro.

0002255

p. 33 (O'Connell) believes that there was something going on between April 1961 and April 1962, but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harvey that when the operation was under way in April 1962, Harvey took over a "going operation".

p. 34. O'Connell believes he must have raised the pills, but he has no specific recollection of doing so.

p. 49. Roselle needed Brian & Troff in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase because he had Varona. However, it would be naive to assume that Roselle did not take the precaution of informing higher ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate.

p. 51 ⁵¹ ~~49~~ June 1962 Harvey said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt. ^{perhaps using the pills.}

SECRET

Harry never named their names or anything about them.

Q 52 Harry says Roselli wasn't kidding him. He agreed with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

para 1 RFK- I trust that if you ever ~~try~~^{try} to do business with organized crime - with gangsters you will let the Attorney General know before you do it. Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request.

p. 64. The Attorney General's copy of the memo for the record of that meeting (May 62 by Senator Houston) is in Archives of the A.G.'s office.

para 7. Major Sam-Toner's letter of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Oswald never did any spying - merely pretended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept done to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected - by his use of co-operation w/ another govt agency."

Trull puts his cooperation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - long before the above rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Reports McBain's bugging incident.

SECRET

p69 20 August 1963 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent talking to man who allegedly says:

Why don't you fellows leave me alone?
I'm one of you!

Person pictured as being approached by
CIA but denying

0002258

AMLSH

- 079
- DR took Presidential Oath which they refused to surrender to Che; but did to Fidel
 - Cuba believed to be in participation in assassination of HCol Antonio Blanco Rico, head of Batista's military in Havana
 - DR quite apart from 20th of July but signed a unity pact

= ... Agency was primarily oriented in helping Cuba achieve its ~~PRON~~ PRON program directed against Cuban military leaders, while receiving his plan for technical assistance in an assassination attempt. The voluminous project files and info furnished us by Nestor Sanchez, Cuban case officer, do not wholly support these conclusions. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cuban's plot.

087 16 Sept 1963

Cuba wrote Torgler - "I don't intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again!" whom you should tell him, "so they don't

SECRET

SECRET

make the trip: I want to get away from politics completely?

19-2 Sancy says that, while Cubela was anxious to do away with Castro, Cubela was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro. What Cubela really wanted was a high-powered, silenced rifle w/ an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards. Cubela finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was) he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the trip.

The Drew Pearson Story

a) Published Details

Robert Kennedy may have signed an assassination plot

The Facts As We Know Them

Not true. He was briefed on Phase 1 after it was over - He was not briefed on Phase 2

b) Three (3) individuals were caught in Havana; one still in prison

It tells Kany on 21 Jan 67, that Kany says 3 men included. We do not know their identities or what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actually disabled. None of the unnamed

captives and speculators during this period of this year

SECRET

who saved enough at ~~that~~ this report has come as
to which IFF was seeking to find in the basic investigation. It
was also stated by Castello was
in the Philippines under secret
investigation. We have no
independent corroboration of any sort. (No
that Camson met w/ Resales
in Las Vegas March 1965)

0002260

SECRET

1977

SECRET

9 May 1967

Beaubien apparently to be used as a source
by Bureau to show Oswald a CIA agent
& was to be used to incriminate Castro. Bureau
alleges he has letters signed by CIA reps
or by Sen. RFK authorizing certain Bureau
to work with Cuban govt. name of Castro.
This memo is intended to record that
such letter never existed & therefore could
not be in Bureau's possession.

0002261

SECRET

SECRET

02265
- Richard Cain aka Robert Scully Cain
DOB OCT 1931 Chicago
Richard Scalpette

- 21 Dec 1960 not finally after

then fewer individuals

- April 01 to April 02 makes

- RFT security called on 4 March 67
to obtain mins; already saw article
of 7 March 67

Bangs in Madrid & claims groups
in Cuba ready.

— failed in July 02

Trail up and up to hill 240 mps
w/ Artime meetings

SECRET

10 Jan 64. "Pepin" Brault Rems approach The WTH.

SECRET

0002266

O'Connor's interview of Malcom in May 1960

- Additional info on S.T. JR & SO contained in material previously shared for review on Sturgis
- Chicago Trib
Dec 28, 31, 1973
- Cain
 - Fall 1960, contact in Chicago
 - Summer 1961 Mexico City
 - April 1962 Mexico City
 - 4 June 62 departed
 - 19 Aug 63 Chicago
 - 26-30 Aug 63 Info - re Student Directory, Miami
 - 12 Sept 63 DRE arms purchase
 - told to get out of picture
 - 1 May 1972 disappear.

27 NW 63

- Fair Play met in Feb 63 at 907
- ~~SD~~ S. Spaulding under brother Melvin Criley
- LHO purchased rifle March 63
- Sturgis suspect LHO in Chicago 1963 April

SECRET

SECRET

6002267

1. Ramon Don Pesterey Dominguez
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936

2. Rolando Magferrer Rojas
DOB 12 Jan 1918

3. Lucio Naves

4. Jose de la Torre

5. Jose Quintana
DOB 3 Oct 45 *replu grange*

6. Joaquin Antonio Cortez DOB 10 Jan 43

Edward Percipit Morgan DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

SECRET

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

Covert Security Clearance on 2 Feb 1951 for use as "cut out" re negotiations for School of Holography & DIT Studies & John Hopcraft Lines.

Amended & Approved March 1951 to include Morgan's use in providing covert legal support for operations in the form of a "cut out"; legal advice transmission of funds in connection with DDO projects. ∴ DDO should make decision whether to release info.

Resumed

Resorts Int. #591 722
 Walker Groves OS file #473 865
 - assoc w/ Meyer Lansky
 - Corp. Grand Bahama Development Corp
 w/ Robert Whisart (#633 974) and
 John P. Roulett (#639 997)

Cairn

According to De Mar, Cairn in Mexico 1961 into 1962

-1964-65

SECRET

SECRET

JOHN FURNACE
9 FEB 1978

0002269

7-Mar-35
St Paul, Minn
3641

Bradley Earl Ayers
Eglin AFB Fla.

April 12, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971

Paragon Air Service
Zimish Technical Equipment - south
campus of MUM VI
Rumh; Harry, Radman (Nep) Big Fader

Tracing sites
Oalo Hts Key
Upper Key Lamp
Card found in edge of P. P. P. P.

Secrets Approval
Date 10 Aug 1964

Refined 23826 (DDP) (WH) 15H

Case No. 366085

Request For Recusal Notice

Serial No
366085

Nature
Separation Return to Parent SUC 12-15-64

Organizational Designations:
DDP / SRS Forward operation Station - JMWAVE
US Field Office Paramilitary Branch Section 117
Reinsman C R C Indiv Pol groups

SECRET

SECRET

0002270

2R/RIFLE

All (cable) traffic being 2R/RIFLE to
be delivered in sealed envelope to Chief
FI/Dur. D. 15024 Bly only

- Personally approved of DD Plans

Harry
Chief FI/Dur. D

19 Feb 1962

To Harry re authorization of ATAIN
for 2R RIFLE activities thru Dec 1962.

Because of sensitive nature of this
activity, accounts for funds will be of
general category & of your custody.

2. Salary \$500 per yr; \$750 in addition to salary

3. Money to be considered in lieu of
project & constitute authorization for all travel
per diem; operational & other expenses

4. Eyes only

Rich. D. Helms.

Hand written notes

Morgan - Roselli - Mahan - Gamm

- Machin Las Vegas

Morgan & Jack Hudson

1) Puerto Augas

2) Augas to April 61 (BOS)

3) April 61 to Lato 61

4) Lato 61 to Lato 62 (Customs & other)

5) Lato 62 to Lato 63

SECRET

Roselli of started in Sept 66
(Mahn to Roselli to Gracena)

to brief 7 May 67

Taylor became chairman of FCS
on 9 Aug 67

Push, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy,
Gardner, Gilpatrick, Lamont,
Mumma, McClure

Memo For Record

Rept at request of DCF; conveyed
to F6 on 23 March 67

The one stayback from copy (to-)
all notes, & other derived source material
destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: Chief WTT (Daren)

From: Dir of Security

Subject: WTT (Security Project)

Final account of memo prepared on
a sensitive project of interest to DD/P, Chief WTT
& Dir of Security

Dissemination

25 Sept 1968 they
6 Feb 1961

SECRET

TO: Cabinet

0900.

SECRET

CCC2272

11 Feb 1961 To Penney/Asst 1920
31 Jan 1961
14 Feb 61 CMMO Review 1,043
26 Sept 1961
Hwy
12 Feb 1961 993

Page 3
To Rpt

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crisis Oct 62 &
collapse of MONROE, aggressive scheme
that was begun in Aug 1960; covered
in April 1962, was finally smashed in 1963

Two other plots were organized in 1963
but were impracticable & nothing came of them

P 9

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Kymon) /
wherein McNamara broadened subject of
liquidation of Cuban leaders.

Result - Project MONROE memo by
Lansdale

31 Jan 64

Discussion at Special Group of a clandestine
service memo of ex-plot to kill Castro.

CIA had refused to fund. State had no interest.

See (C)

Missing
Page

and Secretair

P 2 Gonzalez Ballanterra

Press Release
7 March 1966

-prisoner of conflict for intelligence; not
truth to form report
-Jose ROBERTO, Alberto Ramon Ramon, Luis Tapia

SECRET

SECRET

0002273

Late Sept 1940

Edwards, O'Connell, Bossell of James
Burgess; Edwards then brief
Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Mahon called O'Connell & pointed out
Paradise room saying Gold & Joe
(Presumably in time, Mahon & O'Connell
know names)

Joe a courier to Carter make
arrangements there as only to Gold

Troff making regular trips to Havana
10. 7 Jan '59 - casino closed
13 Jan '59 - Castro announces a opening
17 Feb '59 - Casino announces opening
30 Sept '61 - last casino closed

023. Technical Chief TSD
4 approaches: (1) highly toxic like shellfish
poison to be administered via pin (which Coralline
Roosevelt's suit was supplied to Gary Powers
(2) bacterial material in liquid or (3) cigar
41 handwriting

029. March April 1941

Roselli told O'Connell that Troff knew a
man high up in evil movement. (Vanna)
Rpt from ~~SECRET~~ suggest him Troff.

SECRET

0002274

known values:

- a) 21 Dec 1960 FBI memo re gangster financing Cuban activities to overthrow Castro.
- b) 18 Jan 1961 memo to V with case summary. V had hired Moss as a front man.

CIA had contact in Miami but no indication of any involvement in Cuba.

March 1959 ⁸⁹ TV was in MPR Bureau as consultant to [redacted] 24

- Nov 62 by CIA Staff under the MATJOK a program for exploitation of political consultants.

Roselli to deliver \$400. Estimate very but Feltine says 10,000 + 100 of commission as per secret memo.

Comment - V one of 5 key figures in Rev. Front & major involvement in BOP. Steps taken to end his participation in syndicate plan but apparently ineffective.

People who knew:

1. O. O - original man to go in
2. A V -
3. Son-in-law of HV.

SECRET

Phase 2

SECRET

6002275

Harry briefed by authority of Bissell
in Feb 1961 in connection with a general
stand-by capability for Executive action

Harry had already discussed problem
w/ ⁰⁵ (Arnold Silver) & Sidney both who
look parties pretty cut in to Cuba
project.

Helms briefed on general concept but
not on ongoing Cuba plot ^(mud 05)

AS WIN account of ^(mud 05) Silver use
in Congo; Justin O'Donnell summit with

ZRRIFLE covered as a FIELD operation
(ostensibly to develop a capability to enter sites
& kidnap carriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harry discusses application of
ZRRIFLE to Cuba; instructed by Bissell
to run syndicate operation

Unrelated - Helms puts Harry in
charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harry busy

Early March 62

- March 62 Harry takes over Castro

- Harry view

came to threat of Castro operations
ZRRIFLE as being synonymous.

- Exec Action is synonymous w/ ASWIN

- ZRRIFLE ~~SECRET~~ is used to Exec Action
ZRRIFLE alone meant Castro

Harry's
in operation

SECRET

0002276

A review of his correspondence was unrevealing

(Permut handled Castro operation & L/n use any of assets being developed in ZR RIFLE)

- Memo of Hany after he left Task Force W & going to Rome on 22 June 1963 to Chief FI / Staff that ~~the~~ ^{original} ~~was~~ ^{was} to keep QT was no longer useful & suggested termination.

- Records (OLLA-1974, 24 April 64) show termination of L/Kenby Station on 21 April 64.
There is no indication in the file that the Exec Action Copying of ZR/RIFLE / QTWID was ever used.
Edwards -

- No activity after B of P until Hany met Rosell & reactivated April 62.

- Edwards inf contact w/ RFK over McGuire wiretap

- 14 May 62 - Hany called Edwards & indicated he was bringing Rosell from further west

743
'Hany - took over a "gring" operation since he described plan for getting poison to a favorite Castro restaurant. The mechanics were identical to those described by Edwards and as reported in Phase one & - O'Connell thinks "something going on" between April 61 & April 62 but can't remember

SECRET

SECRET

0002277

April 8th approx

- Harry met w/ Russell & O'Connell
- O'Connell pointed Mahan there
- 1 Harry says he would have recognized Mahan; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when they came to Agony; not since '52 when Harry sent to Berlin.
- Edwards, ^{deliberately} ^{briefed} Harry did not mention Mahan when he first

p45

O'Connell out of June 62 when he was assigned PCS to Okinawa

p47

18 April 62

O'Connell gets call from Russell about w/ Harry in Miami

O'Connell says operation going on when Harry took it over altho he can't remember when it was started

Harry specified that Brian not to be brought in for 2nd phase & further Riddle would appear.

Roselli right that Brian asked him what was going on; R replied "nothing" Brian - "Too bad"

p48

Macco - unlikely a Vannocato friend. Known MAFED Macell who Harry probably would have known. Also, 1/5 clear Macco was Riddleman.

Riddleman went to 2nd phase as a contact to Valera.

SECRET

p 49. When the plane was downed & I saw from the plane
Vama reported arms and equipment needed for
his end of the operation.

0002278

SECRET

April 1962

- a) explosives
- b) detonators
- c) 20.30 caliber rifle
- d) 20.45 cal. handgun
- e) 2 radios
- f) 1 boat radio

I reported arms & support to Roubi
passed word to Harry. With help
of Shaddy, chief of TMDHIS,
about 500 of weapon & equipment.

Harry & Shaddy sent U-Haul
& put truck in parking lot for
delivery to Maco, V, or via son in law.
Harry & Shaddy set up watch on
do Roubi & Connell.

Shaddy not aware of plan.

p 50 May 62 - Roubi reported that the pub in Cuba at the
restaurant reported used regularly by Castro.
June 62

I had ^{dispatched} 3 man team to Cuba
Sept 1962

Harry saw Roubi in Miami on
7-11 Sept. Another 3 man team
of military men assigned to penetrate
Castro's body guard but never happened.
"Medicine" reported safe still in place and first team safe
Sept 62 - Jan 63

p 51
Military men
needed to
take off

Harry in Miami. 22 Dec - a team
saw Roubi & Maco send letter. Gave
Roubi 2700 to V for expense of 3 military
men who never left (in Fla keys)

Delay due to
conditioning
of Maco's

Feb 63

Harry left word for Maco in
Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked
as if dead off. (Just how Harry left this
word for Maco is not clear)

SECRET

SECRET

0002279

Apul May 63

Helms approved a last meeting
w/ Harry Roselli before Harry left
for Rome.

55 People who knew
Bruce Chiver (Harry dying 1962)
knew Harry meeting w/ gangster in
Reno in winter of '62

May 62

Sluf Edwards & Lawrence Houston brief
RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to
pursue writing case but wanted to be
informed of Agency's deal w/ "gangster" again.
RFK asked for a memo of
the meeting via a phone call. Memo
prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston.
NO briefing of McLean, ^{General} Carter, or Helms.

RFK not told that Phase II had
begun; that V had little & arrived late that

On 14 May 62 Harry briefs Helms;
advises against briefing McLean & General
Carter. Writes Edwards that Roselli
is not going to be used

~~Comment~~

RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67
to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

SECRET

SECRET

0002280

of Pearson article of 7 March 62 & apparently wanted to check his recollection of what he had been briefed upon.

Helmus had been in w/ RFX & allowed him to read memo. He did not have a copy.

1954-55 Mahon served by Neardness to offset Onassis control of Saudi oil shipments. Worked at top levels of U.S. & British govt & met at least once w/ Nixon.

O'Connor rept'd that during negotiations w/ Long Committee, Mahon stated he might buy his attorney out of Morgan & put act together.

SECRET

10-11 Sept 62 ⁰³ SECRET

(Wainwright) ⁰³ Tegeduro & Cubela in
Copenhagen & (Wainwright) used "Massachusetts"
& Cubela in ⁰³ "Columbus"

14-23 Sept 62

⁰³ Cubela, Tegeduro, (Wainwright) &
(Earl Williams) from Madrid; met in Paris.
Cubela given S/W training &
supplies; shown a handwritten document.
Refused to be photographed.

(Williams) ⁰³ Cubela that no physical
elimination missions be given as a
request but he might do it on his
own initiative. Headquarters strongly counter that
no physical elimination missions be given Cubela.

5-8 Sept 63

Brasyl - met by (Wainwright) ⁰³
Tegeduro & Nestor Sanchez who became
case officer.

Cubela showed 2 S/W managers but
only 1 record. Official of postal censorship.

That night by Ramon Guin Diego
AMTRUNK-10 who was lady Miguel
DIAZ Izalqui (MICE-14) who had
been sent to recruit PU/PV

SECRET

14 Sept 63

From Brasyl Cubela flew to Paris
& was going to tell Castro after the fact

AmLBSA SECRET

0002281

9 March 61 03 - Mexico City Station
P78 (Jack Stewart) met w/ Cubela
in Mexico City, arranged by Carlos
Tepedeno Hernandez, a long-time
friend. Cubela was (Stewart) from
Havana where he was once assigned.

Cubela and leader of DR
are like group of leftist students signed in
1956 to fight Batista; Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Chik wanted to
defect; according to asset of Miami Station.

Ex-filtration called off a report
that Cuban police aware of Cubela's
desire to defect & his departure plans.
/ Comment:

First of 3 rumormongers within DR; but
unknown if Cubela aware of rumormongers.
Other two links are even more nebulous

~~15 Jan 61~~ 14 August 61

Message from airline station (get from)
Tepedeno that Cubela going to Paris &
wanted to ^{under a friend of Stewart's} talk to DR ~~no indication of any~~
military.

SECRET

15 Jan 62

Lucia Echevarria Bianchi told
an asset (HMI contact-1) that Cubela going
to Helsinki & wanted to defect.

SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see Teydro

0002283

27 June 1962

Teydro appeared FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cubela wanted to defect. FBI sent a teletype memo to CIA since they knew Teydro to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

Teydro dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cubela's "defection" in Paris in 61, so he contacted FBI. Stated his source of info on rumors for defection were w/ Chivarrias.

30 July - 2 August 62 '63

Wm Wainwright met w/ Teydro a jeweler in NYC & took him to Helsinki: Cuba. Told him they recruited "in place" & not defecting.

Cubela wanted to blow up oil refineries; kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet leaders.

7-9 August 62

Meeting in Stockholm because Helsinki for midg. Cubela stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met Teydro in Helsinki.

SECRET

SECRET

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet w/ Cuba who had written Tapedo on NY sheet he didn't want to continue.

CIA had to tell [French Govt] 24 [that contacts were for purposes of defense, French unilaterally keeping Cuba under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy calls that Cuba insisting on meeting w/ RFT; convinced Cuba going to try an attempt on Castro even w/out US support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzguald, U.S. SAs, go to Paris & got approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cuba that US would have no part in attempt on Castro's life.

Winton went from Sandy in company

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states Fitz assumes that Cuba would get cache of rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request

22 Nov 63

SECRET

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22 after getting run w/ ~~Robert Kennedy~~ as per

Sandy says Cuba accepted per but stated he would not take it to

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287

Cubela asked for a cache of arms to be placed at AMTRUNK is L2 high-power rifle w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 20 ^{C-4 sticks} fuses. As they left morning, heard JFK shot.

Sandy stated he rec'd an OP in cable from Fitzgerald that briefly is "off" but nothing in AMLESTH file.

Cubela w/ a take S/W with him to Prague
1 Dec 63

Cubela returning from Prague to Cuba
19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 on AMTRUNK VIII

24 April 1964

Tegedino had been brief to meet Carlos Jorge ROBLES many who has message from Cubela.

097 3 May 64 - Robles says Cubela wanted a silencer
30 August 64

Arturo record info thru Madrid that a group of doubtful members of Castro regime wanted to ~~have~~ establish direct contact. 7 Oct 64, Arturo sends

Alberto BLANCO Romariz.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Arturo agrees to talk to AMLESTH-1 & it turns out he is contact man for internal dissent group. Arturo

SECRET

Thanks if BM288#-1 is chief of criminal
group we can forget about operation
4 Dec 64

Sandy prepares a memo for 6370 for
Arteme to maintain contacts w/ criminal
groups' reps in Prague. Arteme does
6-7 Dec 64

Sandy meets Cubela in Paris & was
told going to continue his plans
Told US. could not be involved.
10 Dec 64.

Arteme didn't know nor Cubela
that CIA in direct contact with them.
Rather STS continued to put both
men together.

CIA didn't want to put select
weapons in ~~the~~ Cubela's hands directly
but could do it. Thus Arteme -
27 Dec; 30 Dec (initials)

Cubela & Arteme meet in ^{London} Madrid.
Arteme reports to Sandy that Cubela
had requested a select for FAT rifle
but Americans w/n gave him one.

Arteme to come up w/ subversor
different rifle in Cuba.

11 Feb 65

Cubela to receive pistol w/ subversor
& Belgian FAT rifle w/ subversor from
Arteme's secy ~~SECRET~~ weapons come
from ~~the~~ US. & are now in Madrid.

Congress

12 Feb 65

SECRET

0002289

Artemio has never talked to Cubela
in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source
is friend of Tepedino who telephoned him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia-Bango Director
arrives in Madrid from Cuba & is introduced
to a State officer.

Obviously close friends of Cubela; & claims
to be in touch w/ group of wealthy leaders
planning to eliminate Castro.

Added in July to 2 for up. Traff.
as source for Capii Hotel. Traff. - 4 months
! Another name - link

June 1965

Letter ESPINOSA Hernandez, a former
PRM trustee who was arrested as a militant
on 20 March 1961, contacted FWS via Diego
FBT on 3 June 65.

ESPINOSA stated he had received letter
from a friend in Paris urging him
to meet w/ Alberto Polanco who had a
message from Cubela who wanted it delivered
to CIA.

Mange - Cubela in a position to help Castro
& would CIA & US Govt be willing to support them
if "yes"; then details on what he needed.

SECRET

Cubela had wanted money in Paris
on 1 Feb 65. Turned down & upset.

16 Feb 65 Sandy gave hint to.
0002290 Tepeduro 7:00 in NY C.

SECRET

23 June 1965 Headquarters sent cable
Hernandez contact. 'convincing proof that evidence
from [redacted] group measure', [redacted] AGAS

1 March 66 - Cubela & [redacted] arrested for
activities in CIA

Jose Luis Gonzalez Ballarín, Alberto Blanco Romany,
Juan Alsina Navarro. Confirmed

Also appearing - Guillermo Cienfuegos
Abram, [redacted] Herminio Vela

Gonzalez Ballarín⁰³ - attests in [redacted] in
contact of [redacted] (former [redacted] "renew" official)
at US Embassy in Madrid. 32

Cubela met w/ Artemi in June
in Feb. 1965.

Artemi sent Ballarín to US to get
Silencio's sign & sender. Delivered to
Blanco Romany who delivered it to
Gonzalez Ballarín then to Cubela the
day before he left Madrid.

Tasco Silencio's sign, F&L rifle +.
9 March 66

Castro sent personal letter that
death sentence not be asked.
10 March 66

Cubela testimony:

Silencio did not break; I threw it
away because it was burning my hands

SECRET

000229 I spoke to Fidel in Jan 64. He opened
the door to me but I did not have
the courage to tell him

(Communist)

Trial schedule confined to trip to
Europe in mid 64 & early 65 to meet
w/ Botkin. No mention of Mac in the
Nov 65 contacts w/ Agony.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Speculate

If full details would have come out,
Castro would have little to complain about.
& probably not to expect someone in our back.

2 high-level
meeting
where Castro
was
discussing

Special Group / August 1

18 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson)
State: Dean Rusk, Alexi Johnson, Edwin
Martin, Richard Goodwin, Robt Hurwicz
which have

Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (RFE absent)
Deputy:

McNamera, Belmont, Tamm, Tamm
CIA - McCone Harry

USIA - Edward Murrow, Donald Wilson

Secy - Thomas Parrot

Parrot's note & a number of
but McNamara & Key would not have
raising it & Munson County.

No one raised McNamara
'happy agent' SECRET

Lansdale note memo on 13 August
to Harry, Hurwicz, Harris, & Wilson which

SECRET

Probab Pearson's info wa high-level
mety was 10 Sept 62

O'Connell interviewed Mahan in May 67
& wrote a report:

1 - Mahan taught Morgan in P-here!

2 - Never heard of Phase II from Roselli
or anyone

0002293

3. Roselli started to Morgan by Greenspan

4 - Mahan suspects Roselli in chain of Morgan

5 - Roselli dummy party; Morgan in
Vegas recently "in contact"

6 - Garrison, Morgan, Roselli in Vegas
in March. ^{business} In truck w/ Roselli; so was Morgan

It is our impression that Greenspan also involved
in the conversations.

^{7/22} Point finger to Roselli as source of info
and to confirm Morgan as Pearson's source.

^{7/23} Summer of 62 - Edwards, Mahan, & Roselli
had lunch & Edwards said he told Roselli
he in front RFK of Roselli's contribution.

Ed & Roselli Mahan
rehearsal non
DA participants
with immediate
knowledge of the
subject Kennedy
right

Pearson's story seems to rely on ref
phase. Could be Harry if ref: source.

Probably from 2 sources:

State Dept meeting + not accurate
so Roselli chief suspect.

SECRET

Inference: Roselli dummy for much &
Morgan dummy & talking to a newspaperman friend (Morgan)

SECRET

Lansdale memo argued drafting papers
for various subjects related to Cuban
operation. A portion of cited from CIA
copy of memo was "enclaves elimination
of leaders". Lansdale repeated tried to
raise assumption of Castro w/ Hany over
next several weeks but Hany did not.

0002292

It hurt 5 people in Lansdale's office
sum. Most took to Lansdale's outburst in
astonishment as part of it.

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room
of White House.

McBryde Bundy, Vance, Malone, Thomas
Hughes & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion
of Cuba.

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jensen as secy.

10 June 64 memo from DD/P to Don
re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 4 per.
Cuban exile: Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch,
Bacardi Rum, to contribute 30,000. He opposed
JMWAVE for US participation. Refused outright
19 August 64

DCI (McConnell) to Bundy - re
FBI interest w/ all participants

SECRET

SECRET

0002294

Publicity has not men its course:

- a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & fact of State Dept meeting
- b) Baum has not revealed full case; C/A should be promptly displayed when he does
- c) Puerto Rican in custody & will be deported

Pearson stay in detail & detail found only in C here the 3 man team.

p 126. Put in it but light - that there is no other motive in Speedy's stay.

p 127. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Baum may also know this.

p 129. Mikum reports that Tupper is in Tampa. Cordell is prima non grata in Las Vegas, being usually registered ^{with police} and he is in town. None of them would have connections about disapp in his CIA connections when he was pulled by law enforcement author. Kennedy has already done it when the FBI was ready him in 1963, Cordell agreed to do it in his conversation with Meyer & Baum.

P. 131. Tupper - 3 May 1967

Commented Bob Baker CIA over a barrel

Tab A

SECRET

0002295

241 July 75 memo

Santer Tropp

4. ST desired person full to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T supported another candidate (cancelled re BGP)

- Mahan former contact subject w/ Office of Security
- Roselli connections

Nov 1967 - illegal entry

Dec 68 - Finner Club

Senate Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff

NO 838-75

9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-10 Dec 1971

DDO

(maybe on continuing the action capability)

5. Who is Torrella (yet another alleged Castro assassin)

DDO

6. - WIRROUZI, operational aliases?

- who was (WIZARD 14) John Stein's memo

- 2 young officers who contacted WIRROUZI

DDO

- want to know John Stein's on all WIRROUZI & the by Walt P. Lee

SECRET

Memorandum

SECRET

5 May 1967

Subj: Wm H. Harvey

0002296

Missing

1. ^{Bill} ~~Harvey~~ ^{Harvey} contacted Papich to report to Papich some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his copy to FBI. He expressed to Papich ---

16 May 67

Tab B Attention Edward Cohen 7 April 77
Finn Bamburo
cc Dale Coy

Morgan associated w/ Agency circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of interest to DDO.

Stuart Pierpont Morgan

DDO 28 May 1913 St Louis

Richard Scully Cain

AKA - Richard Scalpette SS 357-22-333

1969 Tarrant County Tex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Bolden refused to testify before Warren Com. in absence of counsel George Howard.

SECRET

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963 in column Daily Day & Maggie Daily - rumor that assassination planned against FBI of Chicago 9/11/63

SECRET

1 Sept 67 issue of life

Garrison a guest of Mario Marino,
a henchman of Marcella, at Los Angeles
Garrison denied knowledge of Marino's connect
to Marcella.

TO Chief SRS
Sulge. Carr

9 Oct 1967

Info re meeting of Fair Play
under Richard Criley (# 346 116)

Source of info on Guillermo WSCOBOR
who was 'in' of Horace Speeds (SAS)
leads obtained from Ralph PEREZ (44426)
Speed # (199499)

WSCOBOR recruiting Cubans for Communist
Party in Chicago.

0002297

SECRET

File

7 Dec 1978 VCT for Doc of Sec

Ruselli, Jolly

9 Aug 1976

SECRET

Bird memo "Jolly Rendi"

0002298

Tab B & C

Additional info re Troff, Ruselli, & Brewer contained in material previously released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Bruckner
re Arthur Ballito & Fred Hume and

1. 12 Jan 1961 Mahon told FBI he recommended DuBois for an A atty whom he w/n disclose

2. A Hays is James Connelley per a 13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re interview w/ Col. F. Swain who said he contacted Mahon in fall of 1960 for use as a "cut-out" for Havana. Swain gave no indication to Mahon he would attempt to accomplish secret clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974

Memo: Chief Warden Hampton Downer

Subj: Salvatore Bramante & Richard Cain

Re Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31

Dec. 1973

Richard S. Cain # 272141

DOB Oct 1931 in Chicago

SECRET

Left Vice Squad in 1960; Accused
Lohman.
a J.F. from

CIA contacts

A. Fall 1960

SECRET

0002299

Cain initiated contact w/ Chicago office
& obtained info on Cuban exp groups in
Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohman of Chicago Field office
re a Mr. Krougansky who was met w/
President of Panama's ~~investigative~~ Commission.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in Mexico City by CIA staff
identity & purpose unknown

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohman from Panama
offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unannounced visit to Hong
Kong. William Scott & Warren Dean in Mexico City
say he had an investigative agency w/
branches in Chicago & LA which he used to
provide training to Mexican Govt Agents

F 4 June 62

Reported from Mexico for small reward
has books & ~~imprisoned~~ Mexican official
& writing

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Athletic
Club & Dolphin Club by Grace Speed with
Dev Staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCD office.

SECRET

0002300

He would like to work overseas
for CIA

Cain worked for Croft & Shuff
& was in contact with Cubans in Chicago
area & would provide info on unknown
activities of Cubans particularly Paulino Sierra
H. 26-38 Aug 1963

Cain informed the Student Directory,
a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Miro Cordoyos informant in
purchasing arms

2 Sept 63 J. DRE people who had purchased
arms. (Boris Speed) via Washington & Chicago
told Cain to get out of the picture
H. 1967

FBI investigating Cain's associations
& recommended CIA sever contact

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico
City; then disappeared; May 1972 says he
was going to Latin America. Involved
in illegal arms deals (international) &
on various occasions stated he was CIA
M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in Mexico City asked
Mexico City Station for traces on Cain

Eastern Airlines got info. Cain at
Soyuzdetair would find him at Honduras. 5 May 72

SECRET

SECRET

0002301

27 Nov 63

By ROBT B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 987 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Bailey, Secy of Chicago Chapter. Assassination of Rev. Kennedy
3. LHO provided info in March 1963 Shuff's office had not interviewed LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing the officers of UPT
4. Shuff believed in like FBI so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba. If they developed anything definite they would notify inform FBI

~~Could not read~~ "that early in 1963 the Chicago Tribune took over again in U.S. for Fair Play"

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago Sun Times following up a lead that he call C/H re report Bureau would get info from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Butman but to someone in Butman's office (justified)

Breckenridge Memo to Dad of requests

1. Persons in Sec H of paragraph 3 is contained in the 50 volume of material
2. Section B lists 3 American citizens.
Contact is minimal
3. Quarter in Section C
B1 is Arteme; Also used by Mafia in crypto operation

Detectives have already interviewed several who is related.

Tao C

1. Ramon Don Eustorgio Dimongay (shortly)
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas family
DOB 12 Jun 1948
3. Luciano Nieves (shortly)
4. Jose de la Torre (shortly)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 48
spotted again by name to Raul
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo DOB 10 Jan 48
7. Manuel Arteme

TAB C

SECRET

0002303

14 March 1974

Mufson vs Terry Sengner

Frank O'Malley referred Hunt to Bob Mullen of the Mullen Corp.

- O'Malley knew Hughes a client of Mullen's; this information picked up in course of a casual relationship between O'Malley & Mullen in early 60's in connection with Fall Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Mullen met in Paris during Marshall Plan

- when Mullen decided to hire Hunt possible insight in some placements and embezzlement.

- Hunt approached O'Malley for an individual having access to secretariat only staff.

- Thomas C. Amato apparently refused job.

- Houston

- Paul G. intervention w/ Farrell of ISNS re possible deportation of Brancusa.

- only people who knew were P. Invaldi, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

1977 Report

SECRET

0002304

AmTRUNK

Designed to identify & later use suspected persons in current forces in Cuba.

Early '63, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez & Enrique Cayardo Robera defected from the Government of Castro.

Moreno defected in April '61 & assoc. w/ Jorge Volsky; Cuban citizen of Polish origin. Presumably USSR⁴⁴⁰ & then in Polish Air Force under British Command. Married Cuban & arrived in Miami May 61.

early '63 Volsky contacts Ted Sygula & met with Goodwin & Herwitch (State). CIA assigns plan to Miami Station & it is known as AmTRUNK

Never progressed very far & by Sept 63 had 3 sources including Guin

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from AmTRUNK due to indiscretion. He was going to appeal to JFK thru Volsky & Sygula.

Had some contacts but no real action capability; In '65 Guin & Piny arrested.

Sygula & Volsky both Polish & met in Cuba in 195-60

SECRET

Joe Ricardo RABEL Nunez
suspected agent who defected Dec 62 &
joined AmTRUNK; returned to Cuba on her own

SECRET

0002305

X in 65 to infiltrate his family. Arrested & given 30 yrs. but freed in 67.

Accusation RHPZ a Cuban agent as early as July 1963.

Possibly -

It might have been an ingenious Cuban plan from the beginning. Inf action was buying cables & some info & infiltration.

M to

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Marshall, - quotes Sturgis on assassination attempts including using Juan data to bomb Castro. I recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US).

Sturgis' id of RHPZ, prior to its disclosure by external investigators, raises question as to what he knew.

Office of Security wrote memo on 1975 noting connection between Sturgis & Rothman in 1960 citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News story)

Giancana in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be. & pills in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA pills not until Feb 1961, seems that mob had their own plan.

SECRET

- Lorenzo claims Sturgis would have in 1960

Verna

SECRET

0002307

FBI 21 Dec 1960

- MRO support for exile

FBI 18 Jan 1961

V receiving some of that support

Stungis could have learned of Carter
role after Gato settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report

14 August 1964 would a statement by a
person jailed in Cuba w/ Traff.

Other Proposals

1. May 1975

Cuban exile who came to be a
contract employee stated that in Feb 1961 he
was given a rifle & a mission to kill Castro.

Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed

2. May 1977 Anderson column re
Antonio Veciana

On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, 1964)
he proposed to C/S. He was assisting Castro

In 1970 report he made a proposal to
an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

SECRET

1. 3 of messages involved some group of agents

SECRET

0002308

so probably same plan

1. 27 March 1961 AMBROSE 15

Plan to sabotage electric company in Havana & hit Castro at Sports Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with different
mission on 30 March but no commitment
as assassin

3. 5 April 61

only room for 50 men; would try
9 April but need military aid.

a) AMBROSE infiltrated several times
& finally executed 30 August 62 after May
62 arrest. Reported as some identity he was
CIA; & not mentioned in McBrown Book

b) AM COAX 11 ^{the} ~~both~~ persons in

c) AM PUB 11 touch w/ AMBROSE

d) AM PANIC 17
& mentioned in McBrown book, Doug
30 yr sentence

All 3 people sentenced prior to Bay of Pigs
none had assassination mission. Only
AMBROSE mentioned that!

06, 24

4. 4 June 61 [Moratori of Italian Embassy]
claimed he had plans for mission w/in
30 days after killing Fiedl.

Reply was that info was
untrue & (Moratori) confession.

SECRET

SECRET

5. 3 May 61

- 0002309
- from a member of Revolutionary Recovery Movement saying they would try to kill "Fidel today"
 - Reply was "Lay low"
 - Maybe HM Pub 1

Tab D

AMLASH

- Rejects notion that AMLASH a Cuban agent.
- No contact between August 1962 and Sept 1963
- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that AMLASH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as intelligence performer; but approach in chief of staff allowed to recruit his own cohorts.

p 3-4
Summary of Findings

Book V leaves inference that Castro's speech to Dan Barker after AMLASH leak lit CIA had not progressed anything at that time. & I'm met until 3 Oct 63

Nov 19, 63 AMLASH told CIA officer he was returning to Cuba. DPH 20 Nov he was reported as delay until February "if something untoward" AMLASH

p 26 SSC Final Rpt.

SECRET

On 24 Nov Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for names of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico.

Pugne was to determine significance
LHO's contact w/ Soviet

But in reference to contact between a member
of the Soviet Embassy & a Cuban cultural
attache. NOT a report of a contact between
AMLAH 11 and the Soviet

"H" role - Chief did not know of
AMLAH 1163 association w/ CIA

Table E

24 Nov 63 Subj: Cuban Recruitment Activity
Assessment of Pen Herold

28 Nov 1963 D/R 85657 (C/WH/3)
John Wilson - Hudson

29 Nov 63

Acting on FIP report, Agency reports Almeida
be turned over to Mexican authorities.

12 Dec 1963 CSCI-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)
Subj - Wilson, Carlos John

30 Jan 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 (CI/Sec,
Subj: Jack Ruby - LHO

SECRET

20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780/612 (SR/CP/R)
Photos of individual closely resembling LHO

SECRET

10 June 1964 CSCI - 3/781,841 (CI/ROA)
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 CSCI - 3/6/01446-64
V/ADUCT interview on 9 Sept 1964
His comments on 7 Photos Formally ~~700~~

W C Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates.

0002311

SECRET

June 21/1975

1977 D.C. Report

SECRET

0002312

1. Comments on Final

The contents of the CFT are more a series of summaries of how various investigations shall now handle, and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the quality of the intelligence against Cuba showed a negative influence on the quality of their support for the W.C. investigation.

"It goes without saying investigation p 2
they should have facts . . . p 7
Certainly signature, p 7

A central feature of the rationale in the concept that if Castro had been aided by these activities it would have provided serious justification against Pres. Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes it clear that if false this they should have been pursued and accepted at the time of the intelligence against not to mention the W.C. subject a review of the 2 dominant Castro programs to see what it might reveal.

Many views for presentation they in the Final Report & just form of "the

result of an evolution in perception.

ie. Provocation ~~shift~~ in 63 from
back Cuba & USSR from Bay of Pigs.
Minkins; 'along with the army of US
Cuban papers.

"The SSC Find Report has shifted to
emphasis instead CIA ~~operational~~ activity
against Cuba as requiring specific attention.

Review of Agency -

Persons ~~in charge~~ ^{was} know details of 1963
& 1964 operations for the most part are no
longer available. Primary reliance on memory.

CIA has now conducted such a
review - looking at "the other end"
of a possible chain of evidence, which they
themselves could have started. This has
produced no new evidence bearing on the
assassination, altho' it has produced the basis
for new lines of speculation. In fact, the
review sometimes seemed to become
a subtle exercise in trying to put
fault to the provocation theory
rather than being out to bring up
evidence actually bearing on the
assassination of Pres. Kennedy. In essence
sometimes became one of asking if this
theory (which was under review)
could have provided clues to order
the assassination ~~SECRET~~ ^{SECRET} Kennedy had

Ref. Castro) learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLAH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's penetration seemed to be tailored!

Tab C

AMLAH

The Agency had not a tentative understanding with this man during Pur. Kennedy's life, altho the SSC Final Rpt - in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate column in the paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Pur. Kennedy's death the allyship ~~to~~ with AMLAH was amorphous and without substance. Had Castro heard of it he could ~~not~~ have only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

p14. New Consideration on the Syndicate Operation

In a series of stories by Paul M. Hirsch in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1975 it quoted Sturges as follows:

"He [Sturges] was in a room involved in planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had

across to the Prime Minister's office, Sturge said. I knew Fidel's private security guard Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy (Russian embassy in Havana).

"He (Sturge) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which gave him access that would make it possible for him to pass customs. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late June 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late Feb or early March 1961. Orta's role in this operation was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

and on 13 June 1974
Same news source discuss a possible relationship between Sturge and Traffante, also mentioning a woman Robinson as a formerly partner of Traffante. Office of Sec. wrote a memorandum in 1975, noting

SECRET

a connection between Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports.

Butler said Sturgis reported to have had a role in gambling and. On this availability due to her "lost profits." One could deduce that Sturgis and Carter could have known one another because of their connection with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the gambling operations.

From 1976 Sturgis also reports claim by Maria (maur^{ETA}) Lorey that she acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 re poor pills in jar of face cream.

Quotes - FBI memo on "Vanna".
 "This seems to confirm some part involving a woman to kill Castro with poison known, the timing of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own."

SECRET

In fact, it is possible that Vanna already was involved in independent

agreements with the central syndicate when first appeared prior to 1941 in Miami to carry out the Castro assassination. The 1947 DB Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 Dec. 1940, indicates support by the central syndicate for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 Jan. 1941, suggests that Varna was one of these giving that support, altho' this was not confirmed.

... Late in June 64 arrested group plot in Miami area for 150,000.

Speculation that when activated in April 1962 can operate full "blue over smoothly already "ongoing."

It is possible that CFT simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway.

In a sense CFT may have been "piggy-backing" on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction.